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1 Introduction
At present, there is a consensus that individuals’ well-being should be the central object
of interest for public policies. However redistributive policies might be applied to trans-
ferable resources – here referred to as income in a broad sense – that do not have a linear
correspondence with individuals’ well-being. Therefore, the study of resource redistri-
bution such as income transfers constitutes a non-trivial issue for analyses of well-being.
Kaplow (2010) provides a framework for the interplay between the assumptions made
on individual utility functions and the assumptions made on the social welfare functions
(SWFs) for the purpose of income redistribution. This analysis is consistent with SWFs
satisfying the Pigou–Dalton principle of income transfer, which states that a rich-to-poor
income transfer improves social welfare. Kaplow shows that the hypotheses related to
the utility function, being the same for all individuals in the society, play a direct role
in fulfilling the Pigou-Dalton principle of income transfer. Moreover, the assumptions
made on the shape of the SWF have a more subtle influence on such a fulfillment.
The Pigou–Dalton principle of utility transfer, as in Adler (2012), is among the axioms
that help characterize the shape of an SWF. This principle requires that a utility transfer
from a well-off agent to a less well-off one improves social welfare. Adler’s (2012) ethical
view can be decomposed into two aspects. On the one hand, some assumptions on the
utility function have to be made, and on the other hand, the Pigou–Dalton principle of
utility transfer has to be imposed to ensure that the SWF is shaped by a strictly concave
mapping of utilities. The first aspect aims at defining individuals’ well-being, which is
formally expressed as a utility function based on idealized preferences. The question of
whether utility should be determined by – empirically grounded – individuals’ ordinary
preferences or by – normative – idealized preferences is related to this aspect.1 The
second aspect aims at determining the shape of the SWF. The continuous, additive form
of the SWF (additive separability) and the Pigou–Dalton principle of utility transfer are
the key characteristics of the shape of prioritarian SWFs supported by Adler (2012),
that outline some priority to be imposed on worse-off agents.2 Alternatively, any (pure)
utilitarian SWF is designed by a linear transformation of utility so that the Pigou–Dalton
principle of utility transfer is not respected.
This approach with two aspects allows comparing policy recommendations provided
by prioritarian SWFs with those provided by utilitarian SWFs. The assumptions made
1In Kaplow (2010), utility is assumed to be the same function for every individual. This is an
empirical concept whereas the idealized preference is purely normative.
2See Blackorby et al. (2002), and e.g., Bosmans et al. (2018) who propose prioritarian poverty
measures.
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on the utility function are independent of whether the social planner is utilitarian or pri-
oritarian. In particular, as long as the utility function is assumed to be increasing and
concave (i.e., utility is assumed to be derived from income at a positive and decreasing
rate), both utilitarian and prioritarian social planners behave in accordance with the
Pigou–Dalton principle of income transfer. When income has a concave correspondence
with utility, the Pigou–Dalton principle of utility transfer is not equivalent to its corre-
sponding principle of income transfer, because the former is not necessary for the latter
to hold. This relation between these two principles is relevant to discussing the implica-
tions of second-order stochastic dominance in terms of income. The dominance criterion
ensures that a pair of income distributions is ranked if one distribution can be obtained
from the other through a sequence of income increments and/or rich-to-poor transfers,
otherwise it is inconclusive.
Higher-order dominance criteria are able to rank income distributions in cases where
the second-order dominance criterion fails to provide a ranking. Gayant and Le Pape
(2017) explore third-, fourth-, and higher-order dominance criteria, and especially their
normative content embodied by the generalized principle of income transfer a` la Fish-
burn and Willig (1984). The generalized principle of income transfer encompasses (in a
recursive pattern): the second-order income transfer principle which is slightly weaker
than the Pigou–Dalton condition, and the third-order income transfer principle which is
similar in spirit to Kolm’s (1976) diminishing transfers principle. The latter states that
a given progressive transfer is increasingly valuable insofar as the recipient is poorer. It
is equivalent to saying that a rich-to-poor transfer between poorer individuals coupled
with a poor-to-rich transfer between richer individuals improve social welfare. One step
further, the fourth-order income transfer principle states that two rich-to-poor transfers
– one between much poorer individuals and the other one between much richer indi-
viduals – coupled with two poor-to-rich transfers between individuals with intermediate
incomes, improve social welfare. Higher-order transfer principles of income exhibit more
sensitivity to transfers occurring in the lower tail of the income distribution. Gayant
and Le Pape (2017) assert that these principles display an aversion to a general degree
of income inequality.
In practice, numerous redistribution policies involve complex sequences of income
transfers that are relevant to higher-order transfer principles. Let us take a simple
example with two generations x and y whose income distributions are respectively
(20, 20, 40, 60) and (10, 30, 50, 50). Every individual of generation x gives 1 unit of income
to one individual of generation y. Before redistribution, the aggregate distribution is
(10, 20, 20, 30, 40, 50, 50, 60) and after redistribution it becomes (11, 19, 19, 31, 39, 51, 51, 59).
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The second-order dominance criterion cannot rank this pair of aggregate income distri-
butions because the sequence of transfers needed to convert x into y involves two poor-
to-rich transfers: 1 unit is given by the third individual to the fourth one, and 1 unit
is given by the fifth individual to the sixth one. To analyze how a social planner would
rank both aggregate income distributions, the fourth-order income transfer principle is
necessary. Whenever the social planner respects the principle of transfer, and so refers to
the fourth-order dominance criterion, the social planner judges the income redistribution
to be welfare-improving.
In this paper, we compare Fishburn and Willig’s (1984) income transfer principles
with principles which follow the same pattern but rely on utility transfers. As with the
Pigou–Dalton principle of utility transfer, the latter are axioms that help characterize the
shape of an SWF. Alternatively, the income transfer principles result from the interplay
between the assumptions on the utility function and the utility transfer principles. This
raises two questions: (i) Which types of assumptions should we impose on the utility
function so that the utility transfer principle of any given order implies the corresponding
order of income transfer principle? (ii) Are the assumptions involved in an income
transfer principle’s being of a certain order such that they also imply the utility transfer
principle of the corresponding order? Two results are obtained. (i) Assuming that the
utility function is increasing concave with higher-order derivatives alternating in sign up
to a given order s ≥ 2 provides a sufficient condition for the utility transfer principle
of order s to imply the corresponding income transfer principle of order s. (ii) An
alternative characterization of the conditions under which additively separable SWFs
satisfy income transfer principles a` la Fishburn and Willig (1984) is proposed. For any
given order, a critical shape of SWF that corresponds to a maximum degree of convexity
is determined such that the income transfer principle is satisfied, whereas SWFs beyond
this shape fail to respect the principle. Such a critical shape is mathematically expressed
with the aid of Bell polynomials, which are functions of the successive derivatives of
the utility function. This expression epitomizes the complexity of the interplay between
higher-order income and utility transfer principles. The assumptions underlying result (i)
impose weaker conditions on the shape of the SWF than those ensuring the fulfillment of
the utility transfer principle of order s. Hence, under these assumptions, it is shown that
SWFs satisfying a given order of income transfer principle do not necessarily satisfy the
corresponding order of utility transfer principle. The results are particularly appropriate
for providing ethical assessments in a risky framework, where individual well-being should
be function of some attitude to risk. The study of the interplay between utility and
income transfer principles of – at least – order 3 is necessary whatever the degree of
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risk under consideration in an intertemporal assessment. The results shed light on the
implications of assumptions such as individuals’ risk aversion, prudence, temperance,
and aversion to any given higher-degree risk (Ekern, 1980). These risk aversions are
illustrated and discussed through the prism of income/utility transfers relevant to debates
on water scarcity.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the motivations, notation and
definitions. Section 3 presents the main results and a table summarizing them. Section 4
presents an illustration of resource redistribution and water scarcity in a risky universe.
Section 5 presents some conclusion.
2 Setup
Income is denoted by y ∈ Ω := [0, ymax] where ymax is the maximum conceivable one.
Let f ∈ F be a probability measure from Ω onto [0, 1], with F the set of real-valued
probability measures that give nonzero mass to only a finite set of incomes, and have a
total mass
∫ ymax
0
f(y)dy = 1. An (additively separable) extended form SWF, well-known
as the generalized utilitarian function, is a tool employed by a social planner in order to
rank income distributions:
W (f) =
∫ ymax
0
g ◦ u(y) f(y) dy. (1)
As determined by a social planner, g◦u(y) is the weighted utility generated by income y.
In our approach, see also Kaplow (2010), all individuals have the same utility function,
which is a particular position on how utility is inter-personally compared.3 Under this
assumption, utility is fully measurable and comparable. The function g formalizes
attitudes towards inequality. It is increasing in utility by assumption, i.e., g(1)(u(y)) > 0
for all y ∈ Ω, and it belongs to the set of s-times differentiable functions C s, with
s ∈ N := {1, 2, . . .}. Let us write g(s)(u) for the s-th derivative of g with respect to u.
From now on, utility is assumed to be non-negative, i.e., u(y) > 0 for all y ∈ Ω. Utility
functions are assumed to be strictly increasing, u(1)(y) > 0 for all y ∈ Ω , and they also
belong to C s.4
3Actually, this is not the only informational assumption made here. Blackorby et al. (2002) show that
an extended form SWF implies that transformed utilities g(u) are unit comparable between individuals.
The debate on the degree of interpersonal comparability of utility (and transformed utility) is beyond
the scope of the present paper.
4Because of the assumption that utility is strictly increasing in income, the SWF fulfills welfarist
principles. Then, the assumption made on u allows the sensitivity for utility and income distributions
to be studied in the same welfarist framework.
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2.1 Motivation for the extended form SWF
Why is it important to employ an extended form SWF for analyzing redistributive
policies? Because the conditions imposed on the utility function and those imposed on
the g function have different effects on the welfare assessment of an income and/or utility
redistribution. The shape of g has a straightforward effect on the assessment of utility
transfers, and it has an indirect, subtle influence on how an income redistribution is
judged. The function u has no effect on the valuation of utility transfers but it has a
direct influence on how an income redistribution is converted into a utility redistribution.
To illustrate the roles of g and u in assessing utility and income redistributions,
consider the following isoelastic functions u(y) and w(y) := g ◦ u(y)
u(y) =
y1−α
1− α 0 ≤ α < 1 ⇐⇒ u
−1◦u(y) = [(1− α)u(y)] 11−α , 0 ≤ α < 1, (2)
w(y) =
y1−φ
1− φ, 0 ≤ φ < 1. (3)
Consequently, the weighted utility is expressed as:5
g(u) =
[(1− α)u] 1−φ1−α
1− φ . (4)
Let us assume that the functions are parametrized such that φ = 0.75, whereby the
reduced form SWF is w(y) = 4y0.25. Then, the social welfare increases by 0.76 as the
result of an income transfer of amount 1 from an individual with 10, 000 to another with
1. The extended form SWF is g ◦ u(y) = 4[(1 − α)u(y)] 0.25(1−α) . Several parametrizations
of u are consistent with this kind of transfer. Let us investigate two special cases. In
case A, αA = 0.5, so that u is strictly concave in income. Then, g is strictly concave,
gA(uA(y)) = 2.83u
0.5
A (y), so that the change of social welfare is 0.76. In case B, αB = 0.8
implies that g is strictly convex in utility, gB(uB(y)) = 0.54u
1.25
B (y), and the change in
social welfare also amounts to 0.76. Although both cases agree on the change of social
welfare that would result from the income transfer, the assessment of the welfare that
results from the utility transfers, similar in spirit, brings out an opposition between cases
A and B. The social welfare increases by 1.16 in case A as the result of a utility transfer
of amount 1 from an individual with a utility level of 10, 000 to another one with a
5The fact that the weighted function of utility generated by y relies on the two parameters φ and α
illustrates the non-trivial relation between w(y) and g ◦ u(y).
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utility level of 1. In case B, the social welfare decreases by 6.01 as the result of the
same utility transfer (Table 1), whereby the social welfare increases as the result of the
income transfer and decreases as the result of the utility transfer. This is because uB
converts the income transfer into a utility increment (welfare gain) of 0.74 that goes to
the individual with income level 1. Since gB is increasing, the social welfare increases by
0.76 as the result of this utility increment.6 On the other hand, since gB is convex, the
transfer of utility valued to be 1 is converted into a significant welfare loss (decrement)
for the individual with 10, 000 units of utility (−6.75) coupled with a slight increment
of welfare for the individual with 1 unit of utility (0.74).
Table 1. Assessments of utility and income redistributions
Case ↓ Transfer → ∆W : Utility transfer ∆W : Income transfer
A: 2.83u0.5A (y) 1.16 0.76
B: 0.54u1.25B (y) −6.01 0.76
∆W : social welfare variation (ex post minus ex ante social welfare).
Cases A and B describe the story of two different social planners; however both
behave in accordance with the income transfer principle i.e., second-order stochastic
dominance. The next subsection introduces generalized transfers of utility and income
in order to disentangle both behaviors for extended SWFs and higher-order stochastic
dominance.
2.2 Transfers and transfer principles
In what follows, transfers T (·) a` la Fishburn and Willig (1984) are modified in order
to capture a wide range of redistributive principles based either on utility or on income.
The utility increment T 1(α, u(y), δ) postulates that the proportion α ∈ (0, f(y)] of the
population moves from utility u(y) to utility u(y) + δ, with δ > 0. For all f ∈ F and
for all y ∈ Ω, a probability measure h(y) is obtained from f(y) by a utility increment
whenever
h(y) =

f(y)− α at point u(y) ,
f(y) + α at point u(y) + δ ,
f(y) elsewhere.
(5)
Utility increments do not preserve the mean utility generated by f . For higher orders,
mean-preserving utility transfers are deduced recursively. As explained in Fishburn and
Willig (1984), a positive transfer of order 2, T 2(α, u(y), δ), is a particular case of a
6Rounding to two decimal places, uB(10, 000) ≈ uB(9, 999) = 31.55; uB(1) = 5 and uB(2) = 5.74.
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progressive transfer of utility. It is a utility transfer of amount δ > 0 from a better-off
(u(y) + 2δ) proportion α of the population to a worse-off (u(y)) proportion α. Hence,
a part of the population moves from the utility level u(y) to u(y) + δ and another part
moves from u(y) + 2δ to u(y) + δ. Let us remark that T 2 equalizes the utility levels of
the people involved in the transfer, and, as such, it is an equalizing utility transfer.
Figure 1: A positive utility transfer of order 2
As shown in Figure 1, a utility transfer of order 2 is the sum of an increment and a
decrement:
T 2(α, u(y), δ) = T 1(α, u(y), δ) +
(−T 1(α, u(y) + δ, δ)) . (6)
In the same fashion, −T 2(α, u(y), δ) is a negative transfer of order 2 (involving utility
levels at least as high as u(y)).7 It is a transfer of a positive amount δ of utility that
increases inequality in utility levels of two proportions α of the population with the same
utility level u(y) + δ, and, as such, it is an inequality-increasing utility transfer.
Figure 2: A negative utility transfer of order 2
7Let us remark that the utility level presented as an argument of the transfer function is the lowest
one involved in the transfer.
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As shown in Figure 2, a negative utility transfer of order 2 can be expressed as follows:
− T 2(α, u(y), δ) = −T 1(α, u(y), δ) + T 1(α, u(y) + δ, δ). (7)
A transfer T 3(α, u(y), δ) encompasses (i) an equalizing utility transfer and (ii) an
inequality-increasing utility transfer involving a proportion of better-off recipients as in
(i).
Figure 3: A positive utility transfer of order 3
As shown in Figure 3,
T 3(α, u(y), δ) = T 2(α, u(y), δ) +
(−T 2(α, u(y) + δ, δ)) . (8)
Fishburn and Willig (1984) provide a recursive and general formulation of T s+1. We
employ the same idea.
Definition 2.1. Generalized Utility Transfer of order s + 1. For all f ∈ F and
for all y ∈ Ω, we say that a mean-preserving utility transfer of order s+ 1 is given by:
T s+1(α, u(y), δ) := T s(α, u(y), δ)− T s(α, u(y) + δ, δ), s ∈ N.8 (9)
8The transfer should be such that, for r ∈ {1, · · · , s+ 1} even,(
s+ 1
r
)
α ∈ (0, f(y)] at point u(y) + rδ, and δ > 0.
This condition recalls that the proportion of the population who moves from a utility level should be
at most as high as the proportion of population at this utility level. Moreover it demands that no
proportion moves from a utility level generated by a higher income than ymax.
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Although we presented utility transfers first, Fishburn and Willig (1984) introduced
income transfers. Based on the same kind of transformation of probability measure as
Eq.(5), the income increment, T 1(α, y, δ) implies that a fraction α ∈ (0, f(y)] of the
population moves from income y to income y + δ, with δ > 0. Income transfers follow
the same pattern as utility transfers. Although a utility transfer of order 2 equalizes the
utility levels of the individuals involved, an income transfer of order 2 equalizes their
income levels. We now define the concept of an income transfer of order s+ 1.
Definition 2.2. Generalized Income Transfer of order s + 1. For all f ∈ F and
for all y ∈ Ω, we say that a mean-preserving income transfer of order s+ 1 is given by:
T s+1(α, y, δ) := T s(α, y, δ)− T s(α, y + δ, δ), s ∈ N.9 (10)
The definition of generalized transfer gives rise to the generalized transfer principle.
In this context, a principle is a judgement about the welfare consequences when a transfer
is carried out. If an income (resp. utility) transfer of any order from 2 to s + 1 does
not decrease social welfare, the income (resp. utility) transfer principle of order s + 1
is satisfied. Consequently, this principle should incorporate all income (resp. utility)
transfer principles of orders lower than s+ 1.
Definition 2.3. Generalized Utility and Income Transfer Principle of order
s+ 1. For all f ∈ F , for all y ∈ Ω and s ∈ N, the following implications hold for utility
and income transfers:
(UTPs+1) h = f + T `(α, u(y), δ) =⇒ W (h) > W (f), ` = 2, . . . , s+ 1;
(ITPs+1) h = f + T `(α, y, δ) =⇒ W (h) > W (f), ` = 2, . . . , s+ 1.
The second-order income transfer principle ITP2 states that a transfer does not de-
crease social welfare if the transfer equalizes the income levels of the individuals involved.
In contrast, the classical Pigou–Dalton transfer principle requires that a rich-to-poor in-
come transfer reduces the gap between both income levels in order to provide no social
welfare reduction. Clearly, the Pigou–Dalton principle of income transfer is stronger
9The transfer should be such that, for r ∈ {1, · · · , s+ 1} even,(
s+ 1
r
)
α ∈ (0, f(y + rδ)] and δ > 0.
This condition implies that y ∈ [0; ymax − sδ] whenever s is even, and y ∈ [0; ymax − (s− 1)δ] whenever
s is odd. It does not appear in Fishburn and Willig (1984) because they adopt an unbounded income
domain whereas here y ∈ [0; ymax].
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than ITP2. Moreover, ITP3 is a particular case of the diminishing transfers principle.10
These remarks remain valid when comparing UTP2 with the Pigou–Dalton principle of
utility transfer and UTP3 with the utility diminishing transfers principle.
The following set is introduced to analyze generalized transfer principles:
Γ`+1 :=
{
v ∈ C `+1
∣∣∣∣ (−1)`+1 v(`+1) (x) := (−1)`+1 ∂v(`) (x)∂x 6 0, ∀x ∈ R+
}
,
which is the class of real-valued functions whose `+ 1th derivative is non-positive (non-
negative) if `+1 is even (odd), where ` is a non-negative integer. To be precise, Fishburn
and Willig’s (1984) generalized transfer principles are defined on
Γ→s+1 :=
{
v ∈ C s+1 ∣∣ v ∈ Γ`, ∀` = 1, . . . , s+ 1} ,
which is the set of all s+1-times differentiable functions for which the first s+1 successive
derivatives alternate in sign. Formally, Γ→s+1 = Γ1 ∩ · · · ∩ Γs+1. The following theorem
determines the conditions under which income or utility transfers do not decrease social
welfare.
Theorem 2.1. For any given s ∈ N, the two following statements are equivalent:
(i) W satisfies UTP s+1.
(ii) g ∈ Γ→s+1.
Moreover, the two following statements are equivalent:
(iii) W satisfies ITP s+1.
(iv) g ◦ u ∈ Γ→s+1.
Proof. This is a direct application of Fishburn and Willig’s (1984) result (Theorem 1).
The SWF (1) satisfies UTP2 if and only if g is concave. Hence, the concavity of g
characterizes utility inequality aversion. The SWF (1) satisfies UTP3 if and only if g ∈
Γ→3. Restrictions on the second-order and the third-order derivatives provide downside
utility inequality aversion. This attitude amounts the exhibition of more emphasis on
utility inequality for the worse-off proportions of the population. In a general way, going
from condition g ∈ Γ→s to g ∈ Γ→s+1 when s > 3 is equivalent to placing even more
emphasis on inequality for the worst-off proportions of the population. The conditions
under which SWFs (1) exhibit income inequality aversion involve the concavity of g ◦ u.
Then, the social desirability of income transfers rely both on the form of g and that of
u, i.e., assumptions on the individuals’ utility function.
10One could object that the equalizing income transfer and the inequality-increasing transfer involve
different income gaps between the respective donors and recipients. But note that W (h) > W (f) with
h = f + T 3(α, y, δ) is equivalent to W (f + T 2(α, y, δ)) > W (f + T 2(α, y + δ, δ)), in which case both
equalizing income transfers involve the same income gaps between the respective donors and recipients.
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3 Results
Sufficient conditions for the fulfillment of ITP2 are provided by the concavity of g and u.
The following lemma states general conditions for the fulfillment of higher-order income
transfer principles.
Lemma 3.1. The following statement is true for all s ∈ N:
[Hs+1] u ∈ Γ→s+1 and g ∈ Γ→s+1 together imply g ◦ u ∈ Γ→s+1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Both utility inequality aversion and decreasing marginal utility in income ensure
that equalizing income transfers do not decrease social welfare. However, this statement
does not deal with the possible interplay between attitudes to utility inequality and
assumptions on the utility function to make a judgment on income redistribution. Indeed,
assumptions of the concavity of u offset (at least partially) the role of the concavity of
g in ensuring the concavity of g ◦ u.
The same kind of limitation arises when a social planner considers w = g ◦ u as a
simple function of income. The concavity of w characterizes income inequality aversion
but this function does not make any distinction between utility inequality aversion and
assumptions on the utility function. Necessary and sufficient conditions may be derived
from Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 2.1 by employing Bell polynomials. For s, k ∈ N, the
(exponential) Bell polynomial of order s+ 1, k, denoted by Bs+1,k (·), is given by
Bs+1,k
(
u(1), u(2), . . . , u(s−k+2)
)
=∑ (s+ 1)!
p1!p2! · · · ps−k+2!
(
u(1)
1!
)p1 (
u(2)
2!
)p2
. . .
(
u(s−k+2)
(s− k + 2)!
)ps−k+2
,
where the summation is taken over all possible sequences of non-negative integers p1, . . . , ps−k+2
such that p1 +p2 + · · · = k and 1p1 +2p2 + · · · = s+1. We consider utility functions with
all derivatives up to s + 1th order that alternate in sign. The following theorem states
that an income transfer principle of any order does not necessarily imply the utility
transfer principle of the corresponding order.
Theorem 3.1. Let u ∈ Γ→s+1 and g ∈ {Γ→s ∩ C s+1} for some s ∈ N. Then, the two
following statements are equivalent:
(i) W satisfies ITP s+1.
(ii) (−1)s+1g(s+1)◦u 6 (−1)s+1g?(u(1), . . . , u(s+1)) and (−1)s+1g?(u(1), . . . , u(s+1)) > 0,
with
g?(u(1), . . . , u(s+1)) = −
∑s
k=1(g
(k) ◦ u) ·Bs+1,k
(
u(1), u(2), . . . , u(s−k+2)
)
[u(1)]
s+1 .
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Proof. See Appendix A.
The line of thought of Theorem 3.1 can be set out in four steps. (i) SWFs (1) satisfy
ITPs+1 if and only if g◦u ∈ Γ→s+1. This is the result of Theorem 2.1. (ii) We provide the
conditions on g under which SWFs (1) satisfy an income transfer principle of some order.
Formally, (−1)s+1g(s+1)(u) 6 (−1)s+1g?(u(1), . . . , u(s+1)) if and only if SWFs (1) satisfy
ITPs+1. The function g? has a critical shape such that g ◦ u ∈ Γ→s+1. To be precise, the
value of g?(u(1), . . . , u(s+1)) for all y ∈ Ω can be understood as a boundary for satisfying
ITPs+1. (iii) The assumptions on the form of u ensure that the equivalence in step (ii)
is interpretable. Assuming that the utility functions are members of Γ→s+1 imposes a
restriction on the set of values of (−1)s+1g?(u(1), . . . , u(s+1)) for all y ∈ Ω. These values
should be non-negative and they are comparable with the constraints imposed on g under
which SWFs (1) satisfy an UTP of some given order. Step (iv) is a simple corollary:
The income distribution obtained by any T s+1(α, y, δ) stochastically dominates at the
order s+ 1 the same income distribution before transfer.
Theorem 3.1 recalls that the fulfillment of ITP2 by an SWF (1) does not mean
that this SWF exhibits utility inequality aversion, that is, the fulfillment of UTP2.
From step (i), ITP2 is satisfied by (1) if and only if g ◦ u ∈ Γ→2. From step (ii),
g(2)(u) 6 g?(u(1), u(2)) if and only if SWFs (1) satisfy ITP2. From step (iii), assuming
u ∈ Γ→2 implies that g?(u(1), u(2)) > 0 for all y ∈ Ω. In this case, g? is the most convex
function such that g ◦ u is concave. This case is depicted in Table 2, first row, first and
second columns.
Let us illustrate with four figures (Figures 4a–d) the result for order 2 with g(u) = u4
for all u > 0 and u(y) = y1/8 for all y > 0.
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Figure 4: Steps of the proof of Theorem 3.1
(a) Step (i) (b) Step (ii)
(c) Step (iii)
(d) Step (iv)
The interplay between g and u to produce the concavity of g ◦ u is depicted in
Figure 4a. The application of step (ii) yields: g(2)(u) = 12u2 6 g?(u(1), u(2)) = 28u2,
which is illustrated in Figure 4b. Integrating g?(u(1), u(2)) twice yields the most convex
g compatible with the fulfillment of ITP2. This function is g?(u) = 7
3
u4 + Ku + C
with K,C arbitrary constants of integration (see Figure 4c, with K = C = 0). As an
example, consider (1
4
, 10; 1
4
, 25; 1
4
, 25; 1
4
, 40) which is obtained from an income distribution
(1
4
, 10; 1
4
, 20; 1
4
, 30; 1
4
, 40) through T 2(1
4
, 20, 5) where, e.g., both distributions state that
one-quarter of the population has 10 (income). The fulfillment of ITP2 is consistent
with the fact that the Lorenz curve of the former distribution lies nowhere below the
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Lorenz curve of the latter, see Figure 4d. 11
The scope of the results of Theorem 3.1 is beyond “order 2”. The fulfillment of
ITP3 by SWFs (1) does not mean that these SWFs exhibit downside utility inequality
aversion, that is, satisfy UTP3. If u belongs to Γ→3, the “critical shape function”, namely
g?, has a non-positive third derivative on Ω whereas downside utility inequality aversion
is characterized by g(3)(u) > 0. This case is depicted in Table 2, second row, first column.
Table 2 Interplay between Utility and Income Transfer Principles.
ITP2
Respect Violate
ITP3
Respect Violate Violate
U
T
P
2
V
io
la
te
U
T
P
3
V
io
la
te
g(2) > 0∗ g(2) > 0∗ g(2) > 0∗
but g(2) 6 g?(2) but g(2) 6 g?(2) and g(2) > g?(2)
g(3) 6 0 g(3) 6 0 g(3) 6 0
but g(3) > g?(3) and g(3) 6 g?(3)∗ and g(3) 6 g?(3)∗
R
es
p
ec
t V
io
la
te
g(2) 6 0 g(2) 6 0
g(3) 6 0 g(3) 6 0 Impossible
but g(3) > g?(3) and g(3) 6 g?(3)∗ when u ∈ Γ→2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Theorem 3.1
R
es
p
ec
t
g(2) 6 0 Impossible Impossible
g(3) > 0 when u ∈ Γ→3 when u ∈ Γ→2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Theorem 3.1
D
o
m
in
an
ce ︸ ︷︷ ︸
TSD
︸ ︷︷ ︸
SSD
Note: g?(2) ≡ g?(u(1), u(2)) and g?(3) ≡ g?(u(1), . . . , u(3)) ∗for at least some defined u(y)
The effect of Theorem 3.1 is general: The fulfillment of ITPs+1 by SWFs (1) does
not mean that these SWFs satisfy UTPs+1. This stems from the alternation in sign of
all derivatives up to order s+ 1 of the “critical shape function” g? when u is assumed to
belong to Γ→s+1. These derivatives alternate in sign, opposite to the constraints under
which SWFs (1) satisfy UTPs+1 (see Theorem 2.1).
As explained in the introduction, issues of risk-based ethical decision-making provide
a relevant context for applying the results of the paper. The next section illustrates this
point.
11Recall that the Lorenz curve plots the cumulative income share as a function of the cumulative
population share. Lorenz dominance is equivalent to second-order stochastic dominance.
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4 An illustration for risk-based ethical decision-making:
The case of water scarcity
In this section, Theorem 3.1 is applied to a problem of decision-making under risk,
namely, the problem of water scarcity. For the sake of simplicity, the volume of water
in Alfaland is assumed to be at risk due to climate change.12 As in the framework of
Adler and Treich (2014), consumption under risk is examined when the social planner
has an ex post view. In other words, he cares about the difference in realized utilities.
For simplicity, the SWF is ∑
t
g(u(ct)),
where ct is the water consumption in period t, with t = 1, 2. The attitude to risk of any
individual is represented by a vNM utility function u assumed to be cardinally equivalent
to individual well-being (Bernoulli assumption).13 The function g represents the social
planner’s attitude to inter-temporal utility inequality.
The aim of the social planner is to determine the optimal consumption c∗ in the first
period so that the inter-temporal social welfare is maximized. The problem is stated as
follows:
c∗ = argmax
c
g(u(c)) + Eg(u(w˜ − c)),
where Eg(u(w˜ − c)) stands for the expected value of g(u(w˜ − c)) and w˜ is a lottery
representing the risk to the volume of water in Alfaland. By monotonicity, individuals
consume the overall volume of water in both periods. For technical simplicity, the rate
of time preference is assumed to be null and the size of the population is constant over
time.
Adler and Treich (2014) propose optimal solutions for the special case where w˜ em-
bodies a second-degree risk in the terminology of Ekern (1980). As an example, v˜ has
more second-degree risk than w˜ if
v˜ =
(
2,
1
3
; 4,
0
3
; 6,
2
3
)
; w˜ =
(
2,
0
3
; 4,
2
3
; 6,
1
3
)
where, for instance, there are two units of Alfaland’s water with probability 1
3
under
v˜. According to the above notation, w˜ is obtained from v˜ through a resource transfer
T 2(1
3
, 2, 2).
The precautionary savings literature states that optimal current consumption is re-
duced under risk if and only if, in our framework, g ◦u ∈ Γ→3 (this is a direct adaptation
12For more information on climate change and water-resource issues, see Alavian et al. (2009).
13Our results hold for both views: either u relies on the social planner’s attitude to risk or u relies
empirically on individuals’ attitude to risk (e.g., Kaplow and Weisbach, 2011).
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of Leland, 1968 and Kimball, 1990). Consequently, everything happens as if the social
planner were in front of a transfer of resource of order 3, and then the social planner aims
at reducing current water consumption if and only if ITP3 is fulfilled. Two questions
arise: (i) What hypotheses on individuals’ attitudes to risk are such that the distributive
judgments of the social planner imply a reduction of the current water consumption?
For individuals assumed to be risk-averse and prudent (u ∈ Γ→3), if the social planner
respects UTP3 (g ∈ Γ→3), then c∗ under w˜ is at least as high as c∗ under v˜ (Lemma
3.1). (ii) For these assumptions on individuals’ attitude to risk, what is the attitude
to inequalities of utility such that the social planner aims at reducing current water
consumption? Theorem 3.1 shows that assumptions on the degrees of risk-aversion and
prudence of individuals may be sufficient for any social planner who does not adopt
UTP3, i.e., g(3)(u(y)) < 0 for some u(y), to agree with any social planner who respects
UTP3: c∗ under w˜ is at least as high as c∗ under v˜.14
Various economic shocks, such as more or less severe droughts and floods, may affect
the scarcity of water. Then, higher-degree risk effects than those explained above can
reasonably be considered for the repartition of water volume in Alfaland. Let us examine
how the social planner might act in these cases. For this purpose, the sign of the higher-
order derivatives of g ◦u becomes crucial. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008, Proposition
1) show that c∗ under w˜ is at least as high as c∗ under v˜ for every g ◦ u ∈ Γ→s+1 if and
only if v˜ has more sth degree risk than w˜. In our framework, the fact that v˜ has more sth
degree risk than w˜ is equivalent to saying that w˜ is obtained from v˜ through T s(α, y, δ).
However, in this two-period economy, everything happens as if the social planner were
in front of a resource transfer of order s + 1. Hence, c∗ under w˜ is at least as high as
c∗ under v˜ for every social planner who respects ITPs+1. For u ∈ Γ→s+1, Theorem 3.1
determines a class of functions g that yields an unanimous statement in favor of the
reduction of current consumption when an increase of sth degree risk is assessed.
Let us take an example in which v˜ has more third-degree risk than w˜. The lotteries
may be expressed as follows:
v˜ =
(
2,
6
15
; 4,
1
15
; 6,
4
15
; 8,
4
15
)
; w˜ =
(
2,
5
15
; 4,
4
15
; 6,
1
15
; 8,
5
15
)
.
Equivalently, w˜ can be obtained from v˜ through T 3( 1
15
, 2, 2). In the two-period economy,
everything happens as if the social planner were in front of a resource transfer of order
4. Hence, c∗ under w˜ is at least as high as c∗ under v˜ for every social planner who
14Let us consider a numerical example. Let g(u(y)) = u(y) − 13u(y)3, so that UTP3 is not fulfilled.
Moreover, u(y) = y
1
4 . The degrees of risk-aversion and prudence exhibited by u are such that c∗
under w˜ is equal to 1.51 while c∗ under v˜ is equal to 1.2. The consumption difference comes from the
precautionary part of the total water saving.
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respects ITP4. Theorem 3.1 shows that if individuals display risk-aversion, prudence,
and temperance (u ∈ Γ→4), then any social planner with g ∈ Γ→3 and with g(4)(u) 6
g?(u(1), . . . , u(4)) argues that c∗ under w˜ is at least as high as c∗ under v˜. The critical
function g?(u(1), . . . , u(4)) is
g?(u(1), . . . , u(4)) =
− g
(1)(u)B4,1(u
(1), u(2), u(3), u(4)) + g(2)(u)B4,2(u
(1), u(2), u(3)) + g(3)(u)B4,3(u
(1), u(2))
(u(1))4
where
B4,1(u
(1), u(2), u(3), u(4)) = u(4),
B4,2(u
(1), u(2), u(3)) = 4u(1)u(3) + 3(u(2))2,
B4,3(u
(1), u(2)) = 6(u(1))2u(2).
It is easily verifiable that g?(u(1), . . . , u(4)) is non-negative as a result of the hypotheses
on u. Moreover, Theorem 3.1 shows that assumptions on the degrees of individuals’
attitudes to risk may be sufficient for any social planner who does not respect UTP4,
i.e., g(4)(u(y)) > 0 for some u(y), to agree with any social planner who respects UTP4,
in words, c∗ under w˜ is at least as high as c∗ under v˜.
5 Conclusion
This paper has provided a characterization of the conditions under which additively
separable social welfare functions satisfy generalized income transfer principles. Restric-
tions on the weighting function of the utility g yield conditions for satisfying generalized
utility transfer principles. However, conditions for satisfying generalized income transfer
principles are provided by restrictions on the weighting function composed with the util-
ity function of income. On these grounds, the main result determines the restrictions to
be imposed on the weighting function for the generalized income transfer principles to
be satisfied. This sheds some light on the interplay between the conditions imposed on
the utility function and those imposed on the weighting function – displaying attitudes
to utility inequality – as determinants of attitudes to income inequality.
When one considers utility functions with all derivatives up to s + 1th order that
alternate in sign, s being a positive integer, additively separable social welfare functions
that satisfy the income transfer principle of order s + 1 do not necessarily respect the
utility transfer principle of order s + 1. This statement is relevant to applied studies in
which income redistribution is justified by stochastic dominance of some order. Income
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redistribution consistent with stochastic dominance of order s+1 does not ensure a fairer
utility redistribution as defined by utility transfer principles of order s+ 1. Examples of
second-order stochastic dominance (SSD) and third-order stochastic dominance (TSD)
are depicted in Table 1, respectively in columns 1–2, and in column 1.
Finally, it remains the open problem of analyzing the interplay between ITP and
UTP when agents differ in needs. It can be shown that the interplay still holds at the
order 2 for particular extended form SWFs such as Atkinson (1970) extended form SWF.
However, the link between ITP and UTP is lost at the order 3 (see Appendix B).
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.1
For the sake of clarity, we do not make appear the argument of the u function in the
proofs. Obviously it does not change anything to the results.
Proof. Lemma 3.1:
We proceed by mathematical induction, i.e., we first prove that the statement Hs+1
is true for s = 1 and then we prove that if Hs+1 is assumed to be true for any
positive integer s, then so is Hs+2. Let w := g ◦ u. It is apparent from w(2) =
(g(1) ◦ u) · u(2) + (g(2) ◦ u) · [u(1)]2 that H2 is true. Let us now assume that the statement
Hs+1 is true in order to show that Hs+2 holds. We proceed by remarking that:
(g ◦ u)(s+2) = [−g(1) ◦ u · (−u(1))](s+1) .
We then have:
(−1)s+2 (g ◦ u)(s+2) = (−1)s+2 [−g(1) ◦ u · (−u(1))](s+1) .
Remembering Leibniz’ relation for the (s+1)-th derivative of the product of two functions
h · f :
(h · f)(s+1) =
s+1∑
k=0
(
s+ 1
k
)[
h(k) · f (s−k+1)] ,
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then:
(−1)s+2 (g ◦ u)(s+2) = (−1)s+2
s+1∑
k=0
(
s+ 1
k
)[
(−g(1) ◦ u)(k) · (−u(1))(s−k+1)] .
Rearranging the terms yields:
(−1)s+2 (g ◦ u)(s+2) = (−1)
s+1∑
k=0
(
s+ 1
k
)[
(−1)k (−g(1) ◦ u)(k) · (−1)s−k+1 (−u(1))(s−k+1)] .
(A0)
Now we want to prove the relation Hs+2. Then we assume that −g(1) ∈ Γ→s+1 (i.e.
g ∈ Γ→s+2) and u ∈ Γ→s+2. The induction hypothesis Hs+1 is assumed to be true, then
for two functions f and h:
if f ∈ Γ→s+1 and h ∈ Γ→s+1 , then f ◦ h ∈ Γ→s+1.
Let f := −g(1) and h := u (actually if u ∈ Γ→s+2 then u ∈ Γ→s+1), then we obtain that
(−1)k (−g(1)◦u)(k) 6 0, for all k = 0, . . . , s+1. If u ∈ Γ→s+2, then (−1)s−k+2u(s−k+2) 6 0
for all k = 0, . . . , s+ 1. Since Eq.(A0) can be expressed as,
(−1)s+2 (g ◦ u)(s+2) = (−1)
s+1∑
k=0
(
s+ 1
k
)[
(−1)k (−g(1) ◦ u)(k) · (−1)s−k+2 u(s−k+2)] ,
consequently, (−1)s+2 (g ◦ u)(s+2) 6 0. As the statement Hs+1 has been shown to be true
for s = 1 and that the statement Hs+2 has been proven to be true when Hs+1 is invoked,
then Hs+1 is true.
Proof. Theorem 3.1:
[(i) =⇒ (ii)] From Fishburn and Willig (1984), SW (F ) = ∫ w(y)dF (y) respects ITPi+1
if and only if (−1)i+1 w(i+1)(y) 6 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , s}. Setting w = g ◦ u, we get from
Lemma 3.1 that (−1)i(g ◦ u)(i) 6 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , s} since g ∈ Γ→s and u ∈ Γ→s
(actually u ∈ Γ→s+1). It remains to find the conditions such that ITPs+1 is respected,
i.e., (−1)i+1(g ◦ u)(i+1) 6 0 for i = s. We start the demonstration with Faa` di Bruno’s
formula:
(g ◦ u)(i+1) =
i+1∑
k=1
(g(k) ◦ u) ·Bi+1,k
(
u(1), . . . , u(i−k+2)
)
,
where,
Bi+1,k
(
u(1), u(2), . . . , u(i−k+2)
)
=∑ (i+ 1)!
p1!p2! · · · pi−k+2!
(
u(1)
1!
)p1 (
u(2)
2!
)p2
. . .
(
u(i−k+2)
(i− k + 2)!
)pi−k+2
, (A1)
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with p1, . . . , pi−k+2 such that p1 + p2 + · · · = k and 1p1 + 2p2 + · · · = i + 1. Since
(g ◦ u)(i+1) = (g(i+1) ◦ u) · Bi+1,i+1(u(1)) +
∑i
k=1(g
(k) ◦ u) · Bi+1,k
(
u(1), u(2), . . . , u(i−k+2)
)
,
then ITPi+1 is respected if and only if
(−1)i+1(g ◦ u)(i+1) 6 0
⇐⇒ (−1)i+1g(i+1) ◦ u 6 (−1)i+1
[
−
∑i
k=1(g
(k) ◦ u) ·Bi+1,k
(
u(1), u(2), . . . , u(i−k+2)
)
Bi+1,i+1(u(1))
]
=: (−1)i+1g?(u(1), . . . , u(i+1)). (A2)
As Bi+1,i+1(u
(1)) = [u(1)]i+1, thus:
g?(u(1), . . . , u(i+1)) = −
∑i
k=1(g
(k) ◦ u) ·Bi+1,k
(
u(1), u(2), . . . , u(i−k+2)
)
[u(1)]i+1
.
In order to derive the sign of the boundary g?(u(1), . . . , u(i+1)), we have to find the sign
of Bi+1,k (·). Accordingly, we decompose the products of the functions u(·) in Bi+1,k (·)
in Eq.(A1) thanks to the following set:
Λ(k) :=
u(1), . . . , u(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
p1
, u(2), . . . , u(2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
p2
, . . . , u(i−k+2), . . . , u(i−k+2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi−k+2
 .
The set Λ(k) is decomposed into two partitions. The first one is Λe := {u(j) ∈ Λ(k) : j ∈
E}, which is the set of all derivatives u(j) such that the integers j ∈ E, where E is the set
of even integers without zero. The second partition is Λo := {u(j) ∈ Λ(k) : j ∈ O} for
which j ∈ O, where O is the set of odd integers without zero. The cardinals of Λe and
Λo are denoted by |Λe| and |Λo|, respectively. We have by definition of Bell polynomials:
p1 + p2 + · · · = k = |Λe|+ |Λo| (A3)∑
∀u(j)∈Λ(k)
j = i+ 1. (A4)
Case 1: i+ 1 is even and k is even.
↪→ Let us assume that |Λe| is even. As k is even this implies, from Eq.(A3), that |Λo| is
even too. Since u ∈ Γ→s+1, we have the following implication: |Λe|∏
∀u(j)∈Λe
u(j) > 0 ,
|Λo|∏
∀u(j)∈Λo
u(j) > 0
 =⇒ [Bi+1,k (u(1), u(2), . . . , u(i−k+2)) > 0] .
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↪→ Assume that |Λe| is odd, then |Λo| is odd from Eq.(A3). Then, we deduce, from
Eq.(A4), that: ∑
∀u(j)∈Λo
j
 is odd ,
 ∑
∀u(j)∈Λe
j
 is even
 =⇒
 ∑
∀u(j)∈{Λo∪Λe}
j = i+ 1
 is odd
 .
Since the term i + 1 has been assumed to be even, then it yields a contradiction: |Λe|
and |Λo| cannot be odd when i+ 1 and k are even.
Case 2: i+ 1 is even and k is odd.
↪→ Let us assume that |Λe| is odd. As k is odd, we get from Eq.(A3) that |Λo| is even.
Since u ∈ Γ→s+1, we have: |Λe|∏
∀u(j)∈Λe
u(j) 6 0 ,
|Λo|∏
∀u(j)∈Λo
u(j) > 0
 =⇒ [Bi+1,k (u(1), u(2), . . . , u(i−k+2)) 6 0] .
↪→ If |Λe| is even, then |Λo| is odd by Eq.(A3). This case is impossible since i+ 1 is even
whereas we obtain a contradiction: ∑
∀u(j)∈Λo
j
 is odd ,
 ∑
∀u(j)∈Λe
j
 is even
 =⇒
 ∑
∀u(j)∈{Λo∪Λe}
j = i+ 1
 is odd
 .
Case 3: i+ 1 is odd and k is even.
↪→ Let us assume that |Λe| is odd, then |Λo| is odd by Eq.(A3). Since u ∈ Γ→s+1, we
have: |Λe|∏
∀u(j)∈Λe
u(j) 6 0 ,
|Λo|∏
∀u(j)∈Λo
u(j) > 0
 =⇒ [Bi+1,k (u(1), u(2), . . . , u(i−k+2)) 6 0] .
↪→ If |Λe| is even, then |Λo| is even by Eq.(A3). We have a contradiction since i + 1 is
assumed to be odd whereas: ∑
∀u(j)∈Λo
j
 is even ,
 ∑
∀u(j)∈Λe
j
 is even
 =⇒
 ∑
∀u(j)∈{Λo∪Λe}
j = i+ 1
 is even
 .
Case 4: i+ 1 is odd and k is odd.
↪→ Let us assume that |Λe| is even, thus |Λo| is odd by Eq.(A3). Since u ∈ Γ→s+1, we
have: |Λe|∏
∀u(j)∈Λe
u(j) > 0 ,
|Λo|∏
∀u(j)∈Λo
u(j) > 0
 =⇒ [Bi+1,k (u(1), u(2), . . . , u(i−k+2)) > 0] .
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↪→ If |Λe| is odd, then |Λo| is even by Eq.(A3). This yields a contradiction since i+ 1 is
assumed to be odd whereas: ∑
∀u(j)∈Λo
j
 is even ,
 ∑
∀u(j)∈Λe
j
 is even
 =⇒
 ∑
∀u(j)∈{Λo∪Λe}
j = i+ 1
 is even
 .
Final Remark: By definition, we have Bi+1,1(·) = [u(i+1)]1 and Bi+1,i+1(·) = [u(1)]i+1.
Since g ∈ Γ→s, we have therefore (−1)kg(k) ◦ u 6 0, for all k = 1, . . . , i. Then, from
Cases 1 to 4 that:
(−1)i+1(g(k) ◦ u) ·Bi+1,k
(
u(1), u(2), . . . , u(i−k+2)
)
6 0, ∀k = 1, . . . , i.
Hence, from Eq.(A2), (−1)s+1g?(u(1), . . . , u(s+1)) > 0.
[(ii) =⇒ (i)] Let us assume that:
(−1)s+1g(s+1) ◦ u 6 (−1)s+1
[
−
∑s
k=1(g
(k) ◦ u) ·Bs+1,k
(
u(1), u(2), . . . , u(s−k+2)
)
[u(1)]
s+1
]
.
We have:
(−1)s+1
[
g(s+1) ◦ u [u(1)]s+1 + s∑
k=1
(g(k) ◦ u) ·Bs+1,k
(
u(1), u(2), . . . , u(s−k+2)
)]
6 0. (A5)
From Faa` di Bruno’s formula, Eq.(A5) becomes:
(−1)s+1(g ◦ u)(s+1) 6 0. (A6)
From Fishburn et Willig’s (1984) Theorem 1 and Lemma 3.1, if g ∈ Γ→s, u ∈ Γ→s and
Eq.(A6), then W satisfies every ITP up to the order s+ 1, which ends the proof.
Appendix B. Interplay between UTP and ITP with
heterogeneous agents
It is shown below that when households differ in needs, there exists an interpretable
relation between UTP and ITP at the order 2, not at the order 3. Households are
described by income y ∈ Ω and type h ∈ H = {1, 2, . . . , H}. We assume that there
is a finite number of types H ≥ 2. Let F be the joint cumulative distribution function
F (y, h) that is the proportion of households whose income is at most y and whose type
does not exceed h. Formally,
F (y, h) =
h∑
r=1
∫ y
0
f(ε, r)dε, ∀h ∈H , ∀y ∈ Ω,
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where f(y, h) is the joint probability measure from Ω×H onto [0, 1]. Any given bivariate
f that gives nonzero mass to only a finite number of incomes, and has a total mass∑
r∈H
∫
y∈Ω f(y, r)dy = 1 belongs to the set F
∗. For the sake of clarity, we restrict the
SWFs to the class WA of Atkinson (1970) SWFs:
WA(f) =

∑H
h=1
∫ ymax
0
[uh(y)]
1−ρ
1−ρ f(y, h) dy if ρ ∈ R and ρ 6= 1;∑H
h=1
∫ ymax
0
ln (uh(y)) f(y, h) dy if ρ = 1.
(B1)
The parameter ρ exhibits the attitude to inequality of utility. Households’ types are
defined following the definition of needs provided by Moyes (2012).
Definition 5.1. Households’ types (needs): For any given ` ∈ {1, 2} and y ∈ Ω:
(−1)`u(`)1 (y) 6 (−1)`u(`)2 (y) 6 · · · 6 (−1)`u(`)H (y) < 0 ; (B2a)
0 < u1(y) 6 u2(y) 6 · · · 6 uH(y). (B2b)
Utility transfers of order 2 and 3, inspired from Definition 2.1, are analyzed in the
cases where donors and recipients have different types. Let m be obtained from f ∈ F ∗
through an income increment T 1(α, y, δ, k):
m(y, k) =

f(y, k)− α at level y ,
f(y, k) + α at level y + δ ,
f(y, k) anywhere else.
Definition 5.2. Utility and Income transfer of order s between heterogeneous
agents. For all f ∈ F ∗, for all y ∈ Ω, and for given k and h ∈ H with k < h, utility
and income transfers of order s between heterogeneous agents are given by, respectively:
T s(α, u{k,h}(y), δ) := T s−1(α, uk(y), δ)− T s−1(α, uh(y) + δ, δ), s ∈ {2, 3}
T s(α, y, δ, k, h) := T s−1(α, y, δ, k)− T s−1(α, y + δ, δ, h), s ∈ {2, 3}.
Utility and income transfer principles of order 2 and 3 are defined as follows.
Definition 5.3. Utility and Income Transfer Principles. For all f,m ∈ F ∗, for
all y ∈ Ω, for given k, h ∈ H and s ∈ {2, 3}, the following implications hold for utility
and income transfers, respectively:
(UTPs) m = f + T `(α, u(y), δ) =⇒ W (m) > W (f), ` = 2, s;
(ITPs) m = f + T `(α, y, δ) =⇒ W (m) > W (f), ` = 2, s.
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Let us define the following set of SWFs:
W PA = {W ∈ WA : ρ > 0}.
Proposition 5.1. If Eq.(B2a) and Eq.(B2b) hold, then the following assertions are
equivalent:
(i) WA respects UTP
2 and UTP 3.
(ii) WA ∈ W PA .
Proof. See Dubois (2016, pp. 79-83).
Let us now introduce the following set:
W P∗A =
W ∈ WA : ρ > ρ∗ = supy,δ,k<h
ln
(
u
(1)
k (y)
u
(1)
h (y+δ)
)
ln
(
uk(y)
uh(y+δ)
) , ρ∗ 6 0
 .
Proposition 5.2. If Eq.(B2a) and Eq.(B2b) hold, then the following assertions are
equivalent:
(i) WA respects ITP
2.
(ii) WA ∈ W P∗A .
Proof. See Dubois (2016, pp. 87-89).
Proposition 5.3 shows that the interplay between UTP2 and ITP2 still holds in a
framework with agents who differ in needs. Clearly, W PA ⊆ W P∗A , therefore if a social
planner who behaves in accordance with Eq.(B1) respects UTP2, then the social plan-
ner respects ITP2, the converse being not true. However, a step further, the interplay
between ITP3 and UTP3 is lost.
Proposition 5.3. Consider that Eq.(B2a) and Eq.(B2b) hold. If WA respects ITP
3,
then:
−ρ
uk(y)1+ρ
[u
(1)
k (y)]
2 +
u
(2)
k (y)
uk(y)ρ
<
−ρ
uh(y + δ)1+ρ
[u
(1)
h (y + δ)]
2 +
u
(2)
h (y + δ)
uh(y + δ)ρ
.
Proof. See Dubois (2016, p. 95).
25
References
Adler, M., 2012. Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis. Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford.
Adler, M.D., Treich, N., 2014. Consumption, risk and prioritarianism. SSRN working
paper no. 2508440.
Alavian, V., Qaddumi, H., Dickson, E., Diez, S., Danilenko, A., Hirji, R., Puz, G.,
Pizarro, C., Jacobsen, M., Blankespoor, B., 2009. Water and climate change: Under-
standing the risks and making climate-smart investment decisions. Washington, D.C.,
USA, World Bank.
Atkinson, A.B., 1970. On the measurement of inequality. Journal of Economic Theory.
2, 244-263.
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., Donaldson, D., 2002. Utilitarianism and the Theory of Jus-
tice, in: Arrow, K.J., Sen, A., Suzumura, K., (Eds.), Handbook of Social Choice and
Welfare, Vol. 1, pp. 542-596. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Bosmans, K., Lauwers, L., Ooghe, E., 2018. Prioritarian poverty comparisons with car-
dinal and ordinal attributes. Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 120, 925-942.
Dubois, M., 2016. Essais sur les principes de transferts dans un cadre welfariste-
pare´tien avec se´parabilite´ forte. Ph.D. dissertation. https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-
01578428/document.
Eeckhoudt, L., Schlesinger, H., 2008. Change in risk and the demand for saving. Journal
of Monetary Economics. 55(7), 1329-1336.
Ekern, S., 1980. Increasing Nth Degree Risk. Economics Letters. 6, 329-333.
Fishburn, P., Willig, R., 1984. Transfer Principles in Income Redistribution. Journal of
Public Economics. 25, 323-328.
Gayant, J.-P., Le Pape, N., 2017. Increasing Nth degree inequality. Journal of Mathe-
matical Economics. 70, 185-189.
Kaplow, L., 2010. Concavity of utility, concavity of welfare, and redistribution of income.
International Tax and Public Finance. 17, 25-42.
Kaplow, L., Weisbach, A., 2011. Discount rates, social judgments, individuals’ risk pref-
erences, and uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 42, 125-143.
26
Kimball, M.S., 1990. Precautionary savings in the small and the large. Econometrica.
58, 53-73.
Kolm, S.C., 1976. Unequal inequalities II. Journal of Economic Theory. 13, 82-111.
Leland, H.E., 1968. Saving and uncertainty: The precautionary demand for saving.
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 82, 465-473.
Moyes, P., 2012. Comparisons of heterogeneous distributions and dominance criteria.
Journal of Economic Theory. 147, 1351-1383.
Shorrocks, A., 1983. Ranking income distributions. Economica. 50, 3-17.
27
